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PORPHYRY, NATURE, AND COMMUNITY 
Owen Goldin 
I 
Sorabji has recently reminded us, the question of the nature 
and extent of ethical tomoral other thanAs obligations subjects 
human beings was widely discussed in antiquity. One of the chief 
texts is Porphyry, On Abstinence from Animal Food.1 In this pa 
oneper I explore of Porphyry's arguments in the light of today's 
in environmental I draw attention to atheorizing philosophy. 
constraint on acceptable environmental ethical theory: to grant 
equal ethical standing to beings who are not human runs counter 
to the that all moral make.judgments nearly agents actually 
Callicott's version of Leopold's land ethic meets this need, but 
rests on a vague notion of "community." I examine an argument 
inDe Abstinentia 3 that another that meets thispresents theory 
need, but rests on a foundation that is both more nuanced and 
more than that of Callicott's "commumetaphysically grounded 
the Stoic notion of oikei?sis.nity": 
The must restanalysis of Porphyry's argument on untangling 
the basic that are own from those that arepremises Porphyry's 
subscribed to by his opponents.2 In the present case, I argue, 
Porphyry employs as a premise the Stoic principle that one ought 
not harm another to whom one has the relation of oikei?sis, a 
principle that has no place within Porphyry's own theory of jus 
tice. He does so in order to show the Stoics that their own 
entail ethical to animals.principles obligations 
I begin by surveying the general issue of how questions con 
cerning impartiality communityand bear on environmental 
ethics. I then summarize Porphyry's account of the nature of jus 
tice, as presented in Sentences 32 and Ad Marcellam, and show 
how Porphyry follows Plotinus inhis belief that justice in all of 
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its forms is not essentially other-regarding.31 explore Porphyry's 
response to a defense of eating meat that has as its basis the 
rival, Epicurean theory of justice. I then turn to the Stoic de 
fense of eating meat, based on their own account of justice, which, 
like the Epicurean argument, is based on the denial of justice in 
regard to animals. I explore Porphyry's response to this. 
II 
If a ethics is not tenable, the same canstrictly anthropomorphic 
be said about any ethical theory that grants equal moral standing 
of all It is what Aristotle calls an endoxon thatto beings species. 
there are times in which the good of plants, animals, and their 
environment to be sacrificed for the sake of certain humanought 
interests. We need an ethical framework that will allow us to grant 
special ethical standing to some subjects, without surrendering 
all decision to our inclinations thosemaking personal concerning 
on whom our actions have some impact. An ethic of community 
has been offered as such a framework. For it seems that often the 
moral standing of those within one's community is greater than 
that of those outside of it. Further, even within one's commu 
there be certain social structures that thatnity, might require 
not has moral (For oblieveryone equivalent standing. example, 
to other members of one's moralgations family might trump 
obligations that might otherwise be overriding.) For this reason, 
ethicists to the environment andattending to problems relating 
the treatment of animals, most J. Baird Callicott, havenotably 
turned to the model of an ethic of community in order to give a 
theoretical basis to ethical to nonhumans and tomakeobligations 
sense are toof how these obligations to be prioritized in regard 
others.4 
This is a fruitful but it rests on the notion of commuapproach, 
sensenity, which is itself problematic. According to the biological 
of the a is the set of all of the thatterm, "community" organisms 
live within certain tells us thatspace/time parameters.5 Ecology 
among such organisms there will be a network of interdependence. 
Unless "community" in Callicott's argument is fatally ambiguous, 
he must be appealing to such a network in regard to the human as 
well as the natural world. But this casts the net too wide. Not all 
networks constitute a with its attenof independence community 
dant For a machine on which weobligations. example, depend 
might in turn depend on us for upkeep, but we are under no obli 
not to it with one that does a better Thegation replace job. 
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of the limits and nature of ethical is recastquestion obligations 
as the of the limits and naturequestion of community. 
We turn to De Abstinentia in order to shed on this issue.light 
Ill 
DA is a highly complex work, in which Porphyry stitches together 
empirical reports, quotations, argumentsand borrowed from vari 
ous sources. For rhetorical or dialectical reasons, Porphyry often 
makes use ofmaterial that derives from authors whose theoreti 
cal are different from his own. hesuppositions very Likewise, 
sometimes the of anexplores implications argument presented 
in such material, not always making clear that he does not share 
the theoretical basis of the argument. For this reason, it would 
be to review togood Porphyry's general theory of justice, prior 
to the ofDA that concern the issueturning arguments of justice 
in regard to animals. 
Sentences a review and discussion of the account of the 
varieties of virtue that Plotinus inEnnead 
32,6 
presents 1.2, presents 
Porphyry's outline of the varieties of virtue in general, and jus 
tice, in particular. Following Plotinus, Porphyry distinguishes 
four levels of virtue: political, purificatory, actually contemplat 
and noetic. virtue anding, Purificatory actually contemplating 
virtue are together classed as "theoretical," because they are both 
concerned with the?ria, human intellectual activity (32, 14-33, 
3). He discusses each of the prime virtues (wisdom, courage, tem 
and as occur at each level. Becauseperance, justice) they 
Porphyry's account of political justice is our main concern, it 
would be good to reverse the order in which Porphyry discusses 
the levels of virtue. 
Noetic virtue is the Form of the virtue, as present in the hy 
postasis of intellect (29, 8-11). A Form as such is not found within 
a human and ethics has the human level as its focus.being, 
Actually theorizing virtue corresponds to the goal of the prac 
tice of philosophy, as described in Phaedo 67d-69d: the condition 
of one who concentrates on the of the Forms. Toapprehension 
how virtue at this level can be a caseclarify of justice, Porphyry 
refers to the popular understanding of justice as doing one's own 
job (an account of justice that is central to Plato's Republic). Some 
one who has achieved this level of virtue can be considered as 
essentially intellect, and the job of intellect is to apprehend the 
Forms. Accordingly, the justice that is actually contemplating is 
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identical with the state inwhich intellect the Forms.apprehends 
(28, 1-2) 
In order to attain this one's soul must be rid of the cares 
of the body, which, according to the stark dualism that Porphyry 
accepts from Plotinus, is alien to soul. Hence, the variety of vir 
state, 
tue that "leads to contemplation" is "purificatory." 
The theoretical virtues that advance towards contemplation 
{the?ria) consist in keeping one's distance from the things of 
this world. This iswhy they are called purifications, since they 
are seen in the abstinence from actions that involve the body, 
and from the feelings that follow what happens to the body (kai 
sumpathei?n t?n pros auto). (24, 1-4) 
Justice at this level too is a matter of intellect doing its job. 
But purificatory justice consists not in the proper activity of in 
tellect, knowing the truth, but in the secondary function of human 
intellect and logos, which is to rule the body, and in this way to 
still the and make thebodily impulses possible contemplative 
that constitutes at the next level. We shallactivity justice higher 
see that inDA 1 Porphyry advocates a vegetarian diet as neces 
sary for achieving what Sentences 32 calls "purificatory justice." 
Noetic to the level of the Forms. justice pertains transpersonal 
Both varieties of theoretical to a humanjustice pertain being 
considered as an individual, apart from all political and social 
connections. none as such are concerned with theAccordingly, 
relations of one human being to another, the province of justice 
as conceived.usually 
Porphyry begins his account of the political virtues by appeal 
ing to the tripartite division of the soul familiar from the Republic. 
What Plato considers a virtue as applied to an individual, Por 
Plotinus calls a virtue.phyry, following {Ennead 1.2.2) political 
Thus he identifies the political justice with the state inwhich all 
arethree parts (calculative, spirited, and desiring) doing their 
proper job in respect to ruling and being ruled (23, 11-12, cf. 
Plotinus, Ennead 1.2.1, 19-21). This, of course, is the Republic's 
account of the of the from thejustice individual?distinguished 
characteristic that makes a individualscommunity just. Although 
who are in this sense will refrain theirjust from harming neigh 
bors,7 this is a concomitant of the of the individual, whichjustice 
virtue does not a social context for it to be exercised.require 
more about in thePorphyry says political justice following 
passages: 
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Political virtues consist in having one's feelings in a measured 
state, which is a result of following, i.e., being a consequence of 
what is one's actionsreasoning through duty concerning (tou 
kath?kontos kata tas praxeis). This is why they are called "po 
litical," since they aim at no harm being done to neighbors, and 
this comes and a commu from people coming together forming 
nity (koin?nia). (23, 4-8) 
The political virtues put the mortal human being in order. (24, 
5-6) 
Now the condition that is in accordance with the political vir 
tues is seen in having one's feelings in a measured state, and it 
has as its goal living as a human being, in accordance with na 
ture, but the condition that is in accordance with the theoretical 
virtues consists in being without feeling (apatheiai), the goal 
ofwhich is being like G-d. (25, 6-9) 
The goal of political virtue is variously described as having 
measured in order the mortal human livpassions, putting being, 
in accordance with nature and in a manner that causesing acting 
no harm. In the dualistic framework towhichneighbors Porphyry 
subscribes, the mortal human being is the body. The virtues that 
are necessary for bodily health are those that keep one from self 
destructive We are reminded of the whichactivity. Phaedo, 
contrasts virtue with what most call virtue (cf.philosophic people 
68c8-9), the self-limiting that is required for maximal gratifica 
tion of the "nature" as inbody. Taking "bodily nature," "living 
accordance with nature" refer to the samemight perhaps thing, 
the of the to nature inespecially given centrality life according 
the ethics of the Stoics, according to whom all being is bodily. 
What role is here in aplayed by other-regarding virtue, acting 
manner that causes others no harm? we can see how thisAgain, 
might be identified with the keeping one's passions within mea 
sure and with living according to nature, especially if there is an 
reference to Aristotelian or Stoic that humanimplicit teachings 
is natural to human But what relation does thissociety beings. 
have to the self-regarding virtue of achieving the bodily and 
balance of the individual? What does it mean topsychological 
identify what appear to be different kinds of virtue, calling both 
"political virtue"? Presumably, of the two goals, civic concord and 
individual one is the means to the other.bodily well-being, 
measured is a means toConceivably, having bodily passions 
the end of civic in contrast whichconcord, to purificatory virtue, 
is for the sake of the actualization of the individual as an intel 
lectual But within Sentences 32 and Ennead 1.2 we see nobeing. 
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indication that is taken to be basic to humanpolitical activity 
life. The alternative is to understand as thatPorphyry saying 
in accordance with human nature means in a manliving living 
ner best suited for the welfare of the body, and it is to this that 
human social structures are oriented.primarily 
This account is conof Porphyry's general theory of the virtues 
firmed by another passage, from Ad Marcellam. Porphyry exhorts 
his wife to follow the life, which involvesphilosophic following 
the law of G-d, as distinguished from other varieties of law. 
Three laws must be distinguished. They are: one, the law of G-d; 
second, the law ofmortal nature; third, the law established in 
nations and states. So then the natural thelaw, by determining 
extent of the body's needs and by showing what is necessary for 
them, condemns what is pursued vainly or in excess. And the 
law established and promulgated in nations by compact strength 
ens social interaction through mutual agreement about the laws 
that have been established. The divine law, for its part has been 
established by the mind, for the salvation of rational souls in 
accordance with their conceptions. . .The established law, which 
iswritten in different ways in different times, is laid down for a 
particular situation, depending on the strength of the ruler's 
power So then, first you must grasp the law ofNature and... 
from it ascend to the divine law which also established the law 
of Nature. "For the written laws are laid down for the sake of 
the temperate men, not to keep them from doing injustice but 
from having injustice done to them." {AdMarcellan 25-27)8 
We can infer that one with virtue will be one whopolitical 
follows the law of mortal nature. Sentences 32 left unclear the 
relation between this aspect of political virtue and that which 
has as its goal the welfare of others. The present passage sug 
that civic laws make social interaction of the samegests possible 
ofmutual no doubt it also sometimes facilitates theprotection; 
positive goods that come from human interaction, such as philo 
discourse. Whatsophical is important is that Porphyry explicitly 
indicates that its precepts need not be attended to by the person 
who is already temperate. For the law of Nature alone suffices 
for leading people to behave in ways conducive to the health of 
the body, and the divine law suffices for the rest (which we can 
safely identify with the acquisition of purificatory virtue and the 
virtue of one actually contemplating). 
I have to Sentences 32 and Ad Marcellam as evidenceappealed 
that even at does not take tothe political level, Porphyry justice 
primarily consist in how one acts in regard to others. Insofar as 
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these texts conform to the ideas in Plotinus' Enneadpresented 
1.2, what Dillon says of Plotinus' ethics equally applies to that of 
Porphyry: 
He would, of course, observe the vulgar decencies; it is just that 
they would be subsumed into something higher. One feels of 
Plotinus that he would have an old acrossgladly helped lady 
the road?but he might very well fail to notice her at all. And if 
she were he would remainsquashed by a passing wagon, quite 
unmoved.9 
IV 
writes DA to convince his friend FirmusPorphyry ostensibly 
Castricius that he ismistaken in having abandoned a vegetarian 
He that Firmus has been influencedregimen. speculates by Epi 
curean and Stoic the ethical of aarguments against necessity 
vegetarian diet (1.1-3). 
In opposition to Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics, Epicurus pos 
ited bodily pleasure as the end of human life. On his materialistic 
account, there is no fundamental difference in kind between the 
pleasures that come from indulging the body and those that come 
from engaging in the life of the mind.10 The pursuit of happiness 
is a matter ofmaximizing pleasure, which requires making pru 
dential decisions which are to beconcerning pleasures pursued, 
at what times. 
An action or way of life is ethically obligatory only insofar as 
it leads to the happy life, so understood. All justice is contrac 
for the sake of and as a fortual, self-protection prerequisite 
feeling pleasure. The chief Epicurean objection to vegetarianism 
is that it does not lead to the happy life so understood. Were it 
to make a contract with animals, so would be inpossible doing 
our best interest. Such a contract would entail obligations of jus 
tice towards which we would be Butthem, required to respect. 
contract,since we cannot make such a we are free to treat ani 
mals in any manner that we find to our own (1.4-12).advantage 
There are three bases on which to infer what takes toPorphyry 
be the appropriate response to this objection. First, the Epicure 
ans take to be a means to the end of the human andjustice good, 
ethics differs from that inPorphyry's radically of the Epicureans 
towhat that is. Second, as we have seen, in Sentencesregard good 
32 Porphyry develops a theory of justice, derived from the thought 
of his teacher Plotinus, according to which justice has various 
levels. Only at its lowest level is justice in itself concerned with 
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towards others. At this level it has two relatedobligations goals: 
mutual of no harm to aprotection (the doing neighbor) and the 
solicitude for the body. This indicates that withPorphyry agrees 
the basic Epicurean point: that any obligations of justice that 
there may not be to animals are notor may in regard ultimately 
for the sake of the animals.11 This is corroborated thirdby a piece 
of evidence: Porphyry's silence in regard to the Epicurean argu 
ment I consider each of these in turn.against vegetarianism. points 
follows the Platonic tradition in his evaluation ofPorphyry 
the of the These do not constitute the humanpleasures body. 
his of the defense ofgood.12 Following presentation Epicurean 
meat, that bind the souleating Porphyry argues bodily pleasures 
to the body and hence draw a human being away from his or her 
the intellectual of eternal truthproper good: apprehension {DA 
1.33, 39). makes clear that his chief to thePorphyry objection 
Epicurean rejection of vegetarianism is theoretical, concerning 
the very nature of human life and action.of the goal 
A second is that accountpoint Porphyry's own, explicit of the 
nature of justice and law in Sentences 32 and Ad Marcellam pro 
vides no evidence that he would claim thatdispute the Epicurean 
towards as are contracobligations others, such, fundamentally 
tual and hence not such as can exist to animals.in regard 
A third concerns notpoint what Porphyry says, but what he 
does not say. If Porphyry thought that there are other-regarding 
that are not or one's ownobligations ultimately for self-protection 
benefit, he would have responded to the Epicureans by means of 
such an like that in the debatepresenting argument, developed 
with the Stoics in Book 3.presented 
V 
is moreThe Stoic objection to vegetarianism complicated than 
that of the there is a toEpicureans. First, positive argument, 
the effect that meat The Stoics to theireating is good. appealed 
holistic to which the cosmos is an intemetaphysics, according 
grated unity, ordered by the logos which permeates it13 for the 
sake of its rational chief of which from thecomponents, (apart 
logos as a whole) are human beings.14 Nonrational beings serve 
rational as food. Porbeings in many ways, especially Indeed, 
phyry reports that on this view the blood of a pig is there for our 
benefit, to preserve the meat, like salt (3.20.1). So, from the Stoic 
perspective, in eating animals we further the teleological struc 
ture of the whole. 
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Second, there is a negative argument, to the effect that eating 
animals does not contravene the ethical we have toobligations 
wards others, that is, obligations of justice. Although it is this 
argument that is the focus ofDA 3, Porphyry assumes that it is 
familiar to his and refers to itwith a mere nod:readers, 
Since our contend that we have an to exopponents obligation 
tend justice only to those like us, and for this reason they exclude 
irrational animals, come then, let us ask them to consider the 
view that is true and also and indicate thatPythagorean, every 
soul is rational, insofar as ithas a share of sensation and memory. 
For once this has been it will be reasonable for us toproven, 
extend the notion even toof justice to every animal, according 
them. (3.1.4)15 
It is the Stoics who that there aredeny obligations of justice 
to beings that are not rational. Why do they do so? 
The Stoics understand the cosmos to be a rational anisingle 
mal, given its structure, order, and teleological direction by means 
of a stuff called that allfiery gaseous pneuma interpenetrates 
other bodies.16 For the pneuma to do its work, there must be some 
internal mechanism by which parts of a body, as it were, recog 
nize which other parts belong to the same whole. At various levels, 
this by means of a comis accomplished process called oikei?sis, 
monly translated as "appropriation." This is the means by which 
the Stoics account human lifefor teleology in things, including 
and human action. It is by means oneof appropriation that part 
of a living organism does things in the service of another part, 
and an animal does in the service It is also things of its young.17 
by appropriation peoplethat establish ethical bonds with one 
another, particularly the bonds that establish the obligations of 
asjustice.18 People recognize others rational beings, and hence 
come to the others' as their own.19identify good 
Not all human extend their oikei?sis as asbeings fully they 
ought. need to come all raPeople to recognize a kinship among 
tional virtue of their shared rational nature. Thisbeings, by 
process is the ofmoral education and It ispath development.20 
by virtue of the last step of this process that the later Stoics were 
citizens of the world. Thus the of"cosmopolitans," obligations 
are extended to all human of nationaljustice beings, regardless 
or social status. Asity, gender, ethnicity, such, Stoicism 
that all have status as of ethicalrecognizes people equal objects 
aconcern, and provides powerful argument for impartiality in 
our treatment of others. On the other hand, at least among the 
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later Stoics this accounts for limits to the demands of imtheory 
reasons somepartiality, and recognizes good moral for, in cases, 
and other members of one's For reafavoring family community.21 
son determines that human and its aresociety subgroupings 
themselves natural, determined by the cosmic logos by which all 
are ordered.22 One therefore that one's stationthings recognizes 
in life involves certain special obligations or duties {kath?konta), 
which involve one to care for certain intypically requiring people 
that are not on That isways equally binding everybody.23 to say, 
not casesthe relationship of being oikeia to others might in all be 
equal. Filial piety, in particular, receives special attention, as in 
the ethical writings of Epictetus.24 There is no algorithm for de 
the extent and force of the nor how totermining obligation, 
the inevitable conflicts between the demands to alladjudicate 
human beings, insofar as they are human, and the special demands 
to human beings with whom one stands in special relations. But 
this lack of tidiness is a point in favor of Stoic ethical theory, since 
it reflects the ambiguities involved in actual decision making. 
Stoic ethics thus serves as a model for a thattheory recog 
nizes the existence of special obligations that depart from strict 
impartiality without making moral decisions a matter of personal 
inclination.25 
Stoic addresses this issue the world thought by understanding 
as a complex of interrelated, overlapping, or nested structures, 
each of which has its parts standing in the relation of oikei?sis 
with its other Part of the world's structure areparts. teleological 
the various communities in which live and work. Each ispeople 
a polis. Each polis is teleologically organized, so that each citi 
zen has roles in regard to both the whole andspecial to play, 
other individuals. In its recognition of special ethical obligations, 
Stoicism to common ethical intuitions that thegrants legitimacy 
or interest of some moral moregood subjects weighs significantly 
than those of others. 
But for the Stoics, a rational being, qua rational, can extend 
oikei?sis to other rational Outside of the universeonly beings.26 
as a whole and the the Stoics human begods, recognized only 
ings as rational animals. Hence, on their view, there are no moral 
to other animals. As Cicero's Cato it:obligations puts 
Just as they think that rights bind men together, so they deny 
that any rights exist between men and animals. For Chrysippus 
remarked that else was created for theexcellently everything 
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sake ofmen and gods, but these for the sake of community and 
society; consequently men can make beasts serve their own 
needs without contravening rights.27 
VI 
DA 3 is primarily devoted to countering this argument. Porphyry 
does not isolate those exhortations that derive from theclearly 
Plotinian ethics to which he himself subscribes from the argu 
ment the Stoics. But the are so differentagainst starting points 
that it is not hard to distinguish the two. As we have seen, Por 
phyry follows Plotinus inhis belief that to gratify the body is to 
turn the soul from its true in accoraway good, self-alignment 
dance with which is to be achievedIntellect, good by pursuing 
the soul's own intellectual This belief is evidentperfection. 
DA and animalsthroughout (1.28-31 passim). Eating gratifies 
the irrational of the and so hinders its intellectualaspect soul, 
1.32-33 and from meat servesperfection (DA passim). Abstaining 
what Sentences 32 called to this"purificatory justice." According 
argument, the eating ofmeat is to be avoided out of self-interest, 
not for the sake of the animal to be eaten. This is the one ofonly 
Porphyry's arguments directly supporting a vegetarian diet that 
rests to which he is known to subscribe onon premises indepen 
dent grounds. 
We have seen that in Sentences considers other32, Porphyry 
as for the sake of the welfare of theregarding justice "political," 
not the which to be at the core of one's concern.body, soul, ought 
I infer that the argument against eating meat for the sake of the 
of the and not thepurification self, other-regarding arguments 
that constitutes ownfollow, Porphyry's argument against eating 
meat. That this is so is confirmed averby Porphyry's repeatedly 
that his of a diet is meant forring advocacy vegetarian only 
not for the run since thephilosophers, general of people, only 
former have the contemplative life to lose if they are overwhelmed 
by the pleasure of eating meat (DA 1.27-8, 52-3). He would not 
say this if he thought that demands of other-regarding justice 
that the interest of animals be taken into account.28require 
Further support is provided by the following passage: 
All of those who thought that justice makes its entry on ac 
count of oikei?sis in regard to human beings are apparently also 
unaware of the distinctive characteristic of justice. For this 
would make it a kind of love for human beings, but justice con 
sists in abstaining from and doing no harm to anything 
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whatever that does no harm. The just person is to be under 
stood in this way?as having justice, which consists in doing no 
extend to all it is not to be understood inharm, living things; 
the other way. For the same reason its essence is found in hav 
ing the rational part of the soul rule over the irrational part, 
and in having the irrational part follow. The reason for this is 
that when one rules and the other follows, it is altogether nec 
essary for a person to do no harm to anything at all. {DA 
3.26.9-10) 
that fundamental is notPorphyry begins by saying to justice 
how one feels (and by extension, how one acts) towards those be 
in regard towhom one is oikeia, but in the fact that one harmsings 
no being at all, oikeion or not. (Cf. Plato, Republic 335b-e.) Por 
phyry here makes clear that the truly just display the civic virtues 
because are the sort who do no harm to others.they of people They 
do no harm to others not because of any special bonds or relations 
that they have to these others but because just people simply are 
not of the nature that will lead to them harmful acperforming 
tions. Sentences infer that this is because aRecalling 32, we truly 
just person will have the rational part of the soul in charge, and 
this seeks not somecontemplation, other-regarding activity. 
I turn mainto Porphyry's argument. 
We recall the Stoic argument: there are obligations of justice 
towards all beings to which we are oikeia, all rational beings are 
oikeia to us, no animals apart from human beings are rational; 
hence there are to no animals besides huobligations of justice 
man beings. There are two ways in which this argument could be 
countered. One could argue that animals are rational, and hence 
there is human oikei?sis in regard to them; this is in fact the path 
that Porphyry takes. He writes, "We ought not to say that wild 
animals cannot think or be or have even if theirintelligent logos, 
is slower than ours and do not think as well asintelligence they 
we do. Rather, their logos is weak and muddy, like an eye with a 
disorder, which does not see well" {DA 3.23.8). Alternatively, Por 
could have that the notion of to oikeion is to bephyry argued 
to include other for reasons other than sharedexpanded animals, 
rationality. The reader ofDA would have already been exposed to 
a similar strategy. DA 2.22.1-2, part of a long quotation from 
On conventionTheophrastus' Piety,,29 argues against religious by 
that, like fellow human animals are kin {oikeia)asserting beings, 
and it is wrong to murder kin. Theophrastus' reason for this is 
in a inDA 3. He theregiven long passage quoted says that kinship 
and family are determined by common parentage or ancestry, but 
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not only by this: kin and family have in common food, culture, 
and membership in the same kind. It is on these grounds that all 
human must be as kin. We can make the samebeings regarded 
argument in regard to animals, for: 
Humans and animals have the same because thereprinciples 
is no natural basis formaking distinctions among their souls. I 
have inmind the fact that are to desire andthey subject anger, 
and further, the ways in which they reason, and most of all, 
the ways inwhich they all perceive things. . . This is shown by 
the kinship (oikeiot?s) of their passions. (DA 3.25.3) 
from his teacher toTheophrastus departs Aristotle, according 
whom of different do have differentliving beings species prin 
and hence nature there are reasons forciples, by important 
them Generic commonalities allow us to aftreating differently. 
firm that at bottom different varieties of living beings, especially 
different varieties of animals, are the same kind ofthing. Differ 
ences between them are differences of more and less, not 
fundamental differences in kind. 
As it, oikeion has a loose sense.Theophrastus employs probably 
His point seems to be that, on the basis of resemblance, we can 
conclude that there is some sort of affinity between animals and 
human we should treat animals more orbeings. Consequently, 
less as we do each other. But embeds his in aPorphyry quotation 
rebuttal of the Stoic denial o? oikei?sis in regard to animals. In 
context use termthe present his of the quotation employing the 
is obviously loaded. A Stoic might read Theophrastus as making 
the point that shared commonality in psychology or physiology 
is sufficient for animals to be oikeia in relation to us.30 The Sto 
ics would deny this, since these processes occur at levels of the 
pneuma's tensile motion that are lower than that of logos. For 
the Stoics, it is logos that makes us what we truly are, by which 
we are to be identified as both ethical andagents subjects. 
Book 2 of DA ismeant to show that diet does nota vegetarian 
violate conventional Its have asreligious practice. arguments 
their audience those who take conventional to be an adreligion 
equate guide to ethical practice. This is why, in this context, 
Porphyry was able tomake use of Theophrastus' argument in its 
form, without theoreticaloriginal providing any deeper support. 
Theophrastus had rested his argument on the assumption that it 
is unjust to hurt those who are of our kind and those with whom 
we live. This is, on the face of it, a reasonably uncontroversial 
within DA itwas not incumbentassumption and, 2, on Porphyry 
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to provide a theory concerning the nature of kinship, commu 
or But in Book a differentnity, justice. 3, Porphyry develops 
argument, to a different audience. The Stoics he is addressing 
have a and oikei?sis thatdeveloped theory concerning justice goes 
well beyond everyday belief. They restrict obligations of justice 
to rational beings; a refutation of the Stoic denial of obligations 
of justice to animals, on the Stoics' own terms, must rest on show 
that animals besides human are in fact rational.ing beings 
two basic in order to show this.Porphyry employs strategies 
First, he argues that animals are not so different from us in their 
and as to make it unreasonablepsychology, anatomy, pathology 
that they will be greatly different from us in their capacity to 
reason to some his own(3.7-8). Porphyry goes length to present 
catalogue of such similarities; it is to this effect that he also cites 
the authority of Theophrastus. Porphyry also presents positive 
for animal There were at his thearguments rationality. disposal 
resources for this concluto present a metaphysical argument 
sion. to the of Plato's the soul ofAccording cosmology Timaeus, 
all animals is of the same stuff as the soul that animates the 
and it is this which makes toworld,31 possible transmigration 
and from animal forms.32 The human form is the norm, by which 
is ensouled. Animal forms deviate from that as a of the body sign 
aberrance of reason. But such an would not be conargument 
vincing to a Stoic. The Stoics follow the Timaeus in taking the 
world to be a ensouled animal. For them soul is a materialsingle 
a certain motion. The mostuff, pneuma, undergoing pneumatic 
tions that soul are at the level of the world as atypify present 
whole, as well as at the level of individual animals. But this 
motion is not by nature rational. For this, a more complex kind 
ofmotion, that o? logos, is required. This is found at the level of 
the cosmos as a whole, and at that of gods and human beings, 
animals,but is absent within the other considered as such. So in 
the Stoics one cannot for animal onaddressing argue rationality 
the basis of a The must becosmological metaphysics. argument 
must show that the level of ratio largely empirical.33 Porphyry 
nal life is not to be from that of animal life.distinguished 
This iswhy, following the example of Plutarch,34 Porphyry goes 
to some length to present examples of rational animal actions. 
is behavioristic. Animals are seen to comPorphyry's argument 
and to do oriented the samemunicate, complicated, goal things 
as, or similar to, the things we do {DA 3.9-17, 22-24). If it is agreed 
that we do these things by virtue of rationality,35 the same ought 
to be said of animals. As he puts it, "If we do not understand how 
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animals act because we cannot enter their we will stillreasoning, 
not declare them irrational for that reason. For it is not possible 
to enter into the mind of G-d, but, based on what the sun does, we 
have with those who have declared Him intellectual andagreed 
rational" (3.11.3). The mind of an animal might be a black box, 
but the things an animal does are available for everyone to see. 
At its best, this discussion serves to show how are thehazy 
boundaries between instinctive and rational behavior,purposive 
and between animal calls and the use of language. It is for this 
reason that have taken interest inDA.36contemporary philosophers 
At its worst, as Porphyry himself admits (3.4.1), DA 3 strains cre 
with tales of animals to dance, drive a chariot,dulity "learning 
and walk a indeed evenfight one-on-one, tight-rope, <learning> 
to read and write, play a musical pipe or lyre, shoot a bow, and 
ride a horse and so forth" (DA 3.15.1). 
VII 
The main ofDA 3 can be summarized as follows. Thereargument 
tois a moral obligation to respect the demands of justice in regard 
all for whom there is oikei?sis, a class which comprehends ratio 
nal beings. (Contra the Epicureans) this is so whether or not any 
contracts or have been made Animals areagreements (3.13.1). 
rational, hence the demands of justice extend to them as well. 
writes "These considerations and others that we shallPorphyry 
recall in due course (while reviewing the ideas of the ancients) 
show that animals are rational, and that inmost of them logos is 
imperfect but not wholly absent. But if, as our adversaries admit, 
to rational couldn't we have ajustice pertains beings, why prin 
ciple of justice towards animals?" (3.18.1). Included among the 
demands of justice are the demands not to kill, except for certain 
cases in which this is necessary for one's own survival. Porphyry 
tells us that Plutarch and allows one to inflict"grants permission 
a certain amount of harm, for the sake of necessities, if to take 
something from plants even as they remain alive counts as harm. 
But to destroy and kill other things gratuitously, for the sake of 
to the utmost and Wepleasure, belongs cruelty injustice" (3.18.3). 
need to eat, but we do not need to eat meat. Hence the eating of 
animals is an intrinsic evil. (We see that, oddly enough, Porphyry 
the controversial of the that animalsaccepts premise argument, 
are rational, but not the key uncontroversial one, that it is in it 
self unjust to do harm to other rational beings.) 
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The ethical theory that Porphyry works through in opposition 
to the Stoics the Stoic which accounts for both develops theory, 
to all members of a andimpartial obligations community, par 
ticular obligations to particular members of the community.37 It 
does the to include more than thoseso by expanding community 
beings commonly recognized as rational. In this, Porphyry seems 
to be on the track. But for those of us who take as a startright 
existenceing point the of obligations to biota and ecological 
communities, or who disagree with where he draws the line be 
tween the rational and the irrational, he is going about this the 
wrong way. Though forms of rationality, whatever that is, may 
be exhibited animals other than human of usby beings, many 
reject the premise that all of those beings to which we have ethi 
cal are rational. The is to find a notion ofobligations key 
other than mere which includescommunity interdependence,38 
both rational and nonrational but not artifacts and otherbeings, 
that we do not to be moral hebeings grant subjects.39 Though 
does not us its of the Stoicgive solution, Porphyry's recasting 
argument helps clarify the problem.40 
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ambiguity to call into question its usefulness as a theoretical foundation 
for environmental ethics. See S. Shrader-Frechette and E. D. McCoy, 
Methods inEcology: Strategies inConservation (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993), pp. 11-31. 
6. E. Lamberz, ed., Porphyrii, Sententiae ad Intelligibilia Ducentes 
(Leipzig: Teubner, 1975), pp. 22-35. 
7. See Republic 442e-443b. 
8. The translation is lightly modified from K. 0. Wicker, Porphyry 
thePhilosopher: To Marcella, Text and Translation, with Introduction 
and Notes (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1987), pp. 67-69. 
9. J. Dillon, "An Ethic for the Late Antique Sage" in L. Gerson, ed., 
The Cambridge Companion toPlotinus (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer 
sity Press, 1996), p. 334. 
10. See especially Epicurus, On theEnd, quoted in Cicero, Tusculan 
Disputations 3.41-2, A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Phi 
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